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WHAT IT TAKES TO BE GREAT:
ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS ON MAGNANIMITY
David A. Horner

The revival of virtue ethics is largely inspired by Aristotle, but few-especially
Christians-follow him in seeing virtue supremely exemplified in the "magnanimous" man. However, Aristotle raises a matter of importance: the character traits and type of psychological stance exemplified in those who aspire to
acts of extraordinary excellence. r explore the accounts of magnanimity found in
both Aristotle and Aquinas, defending the intelligibility and acceptability of
some central elements of a broadly Aristotelian conception of magnanimity.
Aquinas, r argue, provides insight into how Christian ethics may appropriate
central elements of a broadly Aristotelian conception of extraordinary virtue.

The magnanimolls (or "proud") man has not proved to be the most
durably popular of Aristotle's ethical portrats. It goes without saying
that he is directly opposed to Christian humility. But modern dislike of
him extends far beyond the ranks of believing Christians. He offends that
spirit of equality-partly rooted, of course, in Christianity-which few of
us can escape eve II if we try. - John Caset
The revival of virtue ethics in our time is largely inspired by Aristotle.
Ironically, those who follow Aristotle's ethical picture closely in other
matters typically ignore if not flatly denounce his paragon of virtue: the
great-souled or magnanimous 2 man. To those whose ethical perspectives are shaped by the Christian values of human equality, humility,
and gratitude Aristotle's paradigmatic character often seems closer to
the nadir than the pinnacle of virtue. Even apart from Christian ideals,
some argue, the magnanimous man seems hard to square with the rest
of Aristotle's own, pagan virtue ethic.
I submit that a rejection of Aristotelian magnanimity in toto,
although understandable, is too hasty. Even Christians or those committed to traditionally Christian ideals should take another look at a broadly Aristotelian conception of extraordinary excellence. This for two reasons. First, for the sake of clarifying Aristotle's ethical views generally.
As noted, Aristotle's ethics have proved quite fruitful for recent theorizing about virtue. At best, however, a gap is created in our understanding of Aristotle's thought when we ignore his account of magnanimity;
at worst, especially given magnanimity's prominence, we are left with a
misunderstanding or distortion of Aristotle's ethics generally. Still,
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Aristotle's account of magnanimity poses problems of content, coherence, and compatibility with the rest of his virtue ethics. I argue here
that he has explicit and implicit resources to address some of these problems, but questions remain. Aristotle's thirteenth century Christian
interpreter, Thomas Aquinas-notable (some would say, notorious) for
the extent to which he preserves Aristotle's picture of magnanimityadds not only a Christian cast to the discussion, but also illuminates further Aristotelian resources for resolving difficulties in Aristotle's view.
Second, the notion of extraordinary excellence is worth pursuing in its
own right, for the sake of developing an adequate account of virtue,
moral psychology, and practical reasoning as they are exemplified not
only in "average" cases but also in the thought and action of those who
aspire to extraordinary challenges. Aristotle addressed this notion in
terms of "magnanimity"; I suggest that he contributes some important
insights, albeit not always clear, complete, or ethically admirable from
our perspective. Aquinas's account, again, provides additional resources
for understanding how broadly Aristotelian insights into extraordinary
excellence may be compatible with Christian values and virtues.
I do not attempt here to transform Aristotle's magnanimous man
into a Christian saint, nor do I seek to defend or even try to make intelligible every element of Aristotle's-or Aquinas's-picture. My aim here
is to examine both of their accounts of magnanimity in some detail, to
seek to make intelligible and defensible some of the central elements of a
broadly Aristotelian conception of extraordinary excellence, and thereby
to shed light upon Aristotle's and Aquinas's virtue ethics more generally
and contribute to the project of constructing a broadly Aristotelian
virtue conception of ethics today.3
I

First, a partial sketch of Aristotle's picture of magnanimity in the

Ethica Nicomachea (EN).4 His account of magnanimity immediately follows that of another grand virtue, magnificence, which is the disposition
of giving on a large scale (generosity is the virtue of small-scale giving).
Similarly magnanimity, concerned with honor on a large scale, is related
to an unnamed virtue by which one exemplifies the right concern with
honor on a small scale.
The subject matter of magnanimity, as initially mooted by Aristotle,
appealing to its name, is "great things" (megala). The magnanimous
mans is rightly concerned with great things. 6 What are "great things"?
And just how is the magnanimous person related to them? Aristotle
specifies the relation between the magnanimous man and great things as
one of worthiness: the "magnanimous person, then, seems to be the one
who thinks himself worthy of great things and is really worthy of
them."? Here Aristotle identifies two necessary conditions for S's being
magnanimous:
(i) S thinks himself worthy of great things (Self-estimation condition).
(ii) S is worthy of great things (Greatness condition).
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Failures to be magnanimous are identified as failures to satisfy one or
both of these conditions:

Magnanimous
(i) (Self-estimation)

(ii) (Greatness)

y

Pusillanimous

Temperate

N
Y

N
N

y

Vain
y
N

(Fig.)
One whose view of his own (low) worth is greater than it actually merits
is vain;" one of great worth who thinks he is worthy of less than he is is
pusillanimous (small-souled, mikropsuchos). The greater vice of the two,
according to Aristotle, is pusillanimity: it is worse and it arises more
often. One who accurately estimates his low worth is not magnanimous
but temperate. Aristotle notes, analogously, that a small person may be
attractive and well-proportioned (the analogue of lowly but temperate),
but not actually beautiful (the analogue of great); for beauty requires a
large body, as magnanimity requires actual greatness. 9
We have an early clue in Aristotle's initial characterization of the
pusillanimous pers(;n that (i) is the chief condition of magnanimity.
Aristotle says of the pusillanimous person that he wrongly thinks he is
worthy of less than he is, regardless of what he is actually worth: "and
even if he is worthy of little, he thinks he is worthy of still less than
that."l0 One's stance towards one's worth, whatever it is, is most cruciaL
What is involved in satisfying (i)? Clearly it involves accurate selfknowledge, knowledge of one's own worthiness. If mere intellectual
grasp were all that were involved, however, magnanimity would not be
a moral, but an intellectual virtue. ll But for Aristotle it is a moral virtue;
as we shall see, it is the crown of the moral virtues, which characterizes
the best persons. As I shall argue further in section II, it is pivotal to
Aristotle's conception of magnanimity that right concern with one's own
worth involves not only accurately grasping it, but also sufficiently
esteeming and valuing it, desiring to fulfill its complete potential. We
shall see what is involved in satisfying (ii) as we progress.
Aristotle also specifies his notion of "great things." They are related
specifically to external goods, and especially to honor. "Worth is said to
[make one worthy ofl external goods," and the greatest of these is
thought to be honor. So the magnanimous man has "one concern above
all," which is honor. At the same time, paradoxically, he is said to count
honors for little, even despising goods of fortune. 12 In any case, "the
magnanimous person has the right concern with honor and dishonor." l'
Aristotle's initial emphasis in his account of magnanimity is thus
upon honor, which is evidently understood to be a kind of external
good, i.e. the reception of acclaim and wealth. A further, more internal
emphasis arises in Aristotle's account as well, however: that of virtue or
excellence. The honor in view must be of the right sort:
The magnanimous person, then, is concerned especially with honors and dishonors. And when he receives great honors from excellent people, he will be moderately pleased, thinking he is getting
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what is proper to him, or even less. For there can be no honor worthy of complete virtue; but still he will accept [excellent people's]
honors, since they have nothing greater to award him. ,.
The honor in view, then, is that for which the virtue of the magnanimous
man makes him worthy. Honor is the prize of virtue; only the good person
is worthy of honors.15 The magnanimous person is the greatest in each
virtue; magnanimity is a sort of crowning ornament (kosmos tis) to the
virtues, "for it makes them greater, and it does not arise without them." It
is impossible to be magnanimous without being fine or noble and good. '6
Finally, Aristotle's magnanimous man (in contrast to the pseudomagnanimous person) is distinguished by his attitudes and actions, including
the ability to handle properly the great honors and external goods that
come his way. Virtue is needed to ''bear the results of good fortune suitably."!7 His distinctive attitudes toward others express his fineness: he is
open in speech and action, unconcerned with praising or being praised, but
laconic and ironic (eir6neia) toward those of lesser excellence, not seeking to
display his superiority to them.!S Those with merely a semblance of magnanimity, on the other hand, become arrogant and wantonly aggressive, seeking to imitate the distinctive actions and attitudes of the magnanimous man,
but doing what they please rather than what is fine. The magnanimous person is discriminating: he deems himself worthy of only great honors, and
will disdain as beneath his worth being honored by just anyone or for
something small. Unlike those who imitate him in despising or showing
contempt for others, however, the magnanimous person justifiably despises
other people, because his beliefs (about his worth and theirs) are true.!9 The
magnanimous man is eager to be superior in doing good: he does good but
is ashamed to receive it. He wishes others always to be in his debt, and not
he in theirs, because being a recipient is inferior and he wishes to be superior. He seems to remember only the good he does, not what he receives; and
he likewise finds pleasure only in hearing of the good he has done. 20
II

There are admirable traits among those here depicted, but as 17 whole the
picture is an unpleasant one . .. The passage simply betrays somewhat
nakedly the self-absorption which is the bad side of Aristotle's ethics.
- W.D. Ross2!

He is very nearly an English gentleman.

- Alasdair MacIntyre 22

A number of objections have been raised against Aristotle's account.
I shall consider several important problems here/ 3 and attempt to
answer them from within Aristotle's own, albeit in some cases, implicit
resources. First, Aristotle's picture of magnanimity appears to suffer
from problems of coherence, containing internal tensions and standing in
tension with other elements of his virtue-ethical schema.
1. The relationship of magnanimity to external goods (including honor) is
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problematic. The magnanimous person is said on the one hand to be concerned primarily with honor-indeed, according to one critic, obsessed
with honor.'" On the other hand he is said to count honor for little, to have
a moderate attitude toward the goods of fortune, even to despise them.
Are honors, then, to be sought or despised? Further, while initially
Aristotle's magnanimous man seems to be characterized chiefly by his
great claims to honor, as the portrait progresses superlative virtue rather
than honor appears to take center stage. Is the magnanimous person's
concern honor or is it virtue?25 Does Aristotle actually tie one's moral status to one's reception of honors? Several interpreters have argued that
these tensions in Aristotle's account are the result of his attempt to combine two very different "common beliefs" or endoxa, two competing, popular conceptions of magnanimity of his time: that of the Homeric hero
who values greatness, grandeur, and honor; and that of the Socratic,
moral hero who is indifferent to goods of fortune (including honor), and
who values virtue supremely.2b Aristotle's attempt is unsuccessful, on this
view, because these are incompatible conceptions of ideal virtue.
Aristotle can go some distance towards resolving these tensions.
First, the two tensions I have mentioned are linked. Aristotle is specific
as to whether the magnanimous person seeks (or despises) honor, on the
basis of its relation to virtue. In the EE Aristotle addresses the apparent
inconsistency between one's being concerned above all with honor and
yet disdaining the multitude and reputation. He makes a distinction:
honor may be distinguished by who gives it-whether a crowd of ordinary men or those worthy of consideration; and by the ground upon
which it is given-whether or not it is truly great. 27 Honor is to be
despised when given by less than good people, or for less than excellent
things, but sought from good people, for great things. 28 That is, whether
or not honor is to be sought depends upon its relation to virtue-as
exemplified by the giver and the recipient.
Second, relatedly, Aristotle appears to speak of honor in more than
one way, or homonymously.29 The magnanimous person's being concerned for "honor" may signify
(RH) Concern for "being honored" (i.e. receiving honor), or
(DH) Concern for "being honorable" (i.e. being worthy of or
deserving honor, exemplifying virtue).
The objection that Aristotle's account reflects an unresolved tension
between seeking honor and exemplifying virtue depends upon what
seems to me to be an uncharitable-and unwarranted-reading of
"honor" as univocally or exclusively signifying (RH). Aristotle certainly
does construe "honor" in terms of (RH). Still, there is good reason to
think that he also understands it in terms of (DH), and moreover considers the latter to be of primary, although less explicit importance.
Throughout his account Aristotle distinguishes, both implicitly and
explicitly, between receiving honor and being worthy of honor-not discounting the former, but emphasizing the latter as the primary concern
of magnanimity. For example:
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(a) Both the magnanimous and the well-born and rich are honored,
but only the good person is honorable (timeteos).30
(b) The counterfeit magnanimous and the truly magnanimous are
distinguished by how they handle the results of good fortune
(which, in the context, includes receiving honor): only with
virtue can one bear them suitably (i.e. honorably; emmeI6s).'1
(c) Honor has objective value as the proper reward of virtue, and
the magnanimous person accepts it only when it is deserved,
and from excellent people. 32
In each of these instances, explicit in (a) and implicit in (b) and (c), a distinction between (RH) and (DH) is presupposed, and honor construed as
(DH) is primarily to be valued. Indeed Aristotle's contrast in (a) is unintelligible if he understands "honor" only in terms of "being honored."
Aristotle's use of "honor," then, reflects the homonymy we have
noted, and we need not attribute to him a confusion or incoherence. 3 '
Moreover, by recognizing the homonymy we are able to understand this
account as exemplifying Aristotle's characteristic strategy of affirming
central elements of each of the competing endoxa, but on his own terms.
In this case he is able to affirm the common belief that honor is the central
concern of magnanimity. With the Socratic ideal he maintains that the
magnanimous person's primary concern is to act honorably, to be worthy
of honor; with the Homeric ideal he grants the objective value of honors
received, yet only insofar as they rightly reward greatness in the virtues.
The magnanimous person's moral status need be tied only to the latter,
not the former. It is important to note, however, that, unlike later, e.g.
Stoic views, Aristotle does not exclude received goods of fortune from
ethical view. External goods and honors contribute to magnanimity.3'
Magnanimity is needed not only in order to be worthy of honor, but also
to handle well honors that may be (and often are) received. Both honors
deserved and honors received are in view and stressed.'s
2. There appear to be tensions between Aristotle's account of magnanimity and other features of his virtue-ethical schema. First, Aristotelian
virtues concern passions and actions/6 yet the subject matter of magnanimity is honors, which is neither. Moreover in this case the right exercise of the virtue is tied necessarily to an object external to the agent.
How may this be accounted for in an Aristotelian virtue conception?
Aristotle provides little insight into how external objects may be
related to action and passion within his virtue picture, especially in the
case of magnanimity.37 However, honor for Aristotle is related in great
part to action. We have already seen that honor and virtue are closely
related; honor and excellent action are also closely related, which should
not be surprising in light of Aristotle's general metaphysical teleology
according to which a virtue is perfected in action. Although Aristotle
does not make it explicit in his account of magnanimity proper, he does
indicate, I suggest, that the magnanimous person's concern for great
things is broader than a concern to obtain his glorious deserts, but also
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includes a concern to aim at extraordinarily excellent action. This concern becomes more explicit in Aristotle's portrayal of the vices related to
magnanimity. According to Aristotle the goods of which the pusillanimous person deprives himself (Le. "great things") because he does not
esteem himself worthy of them, include not only external goods
(Aristotle's stress thus far), but also "fine actions and practices." If the
pusillanimous person knew his worth he would aim at these things
rather than hold back, because "each person seeks what [he thinks] he is
worth."38 The vain, on the other hand, attempt exploits and pretend to
honors of which they are not worthy, and clothe themselves with the
trappings of honor unworthily.39 Thus the great things about which the
magnanimous person is concerned include both deeds and desert,,-excellent actions and exploits as well as the proper rewards of those actions:o
The picture emerges, then, that the actual greatness of personal
worth, (ii), which the magnanimous person correctly perceives himself
to possess, (i), comprises both (a) what is needed to accomplish acts of
extraordinary excellence: those abilities, strengths, dispositions, and
opportunities which would enable him to accomplish great exploits and
fine actions, such as great heroism on the battlefield," which are rightly
rewarded by the "trappings" of great honors; and (b) the disposition to
handle such honors well when they are forthcoming. The magnanimous
person, then, is one who recognizes accurately and esteems sufficiently his

ability to accomplish extraordinary actions of virtue, and handles well his success in accomplishing them. On this picture, the rival Homeric and
Socratic conceptions of magnanimity are in fact quite close: a stress on
excellent acts (as opposed to merely deserts) on the part of the Homeric
magnanimous person renders him very like the Socratic magnanimous
person who excels in virtue, since on Aristotle's theory virtue is exemplified essentially in excellent action.
Another tension, between Aristotle's account of magnanimity and his
general picture of virtue as a mean, is exemplified in an apparent conflict
between the two necessary conditions for magnanimity (the self-estimation (i) and greatness (ii) conditions). While (i) may plausibly be construed as a mean, viz. a mean state of discernment or perception, (ii)-by
its built-in extreme condition-does not obviously fit Aristotle's framework of virtues as means or intermediate states. Indeed Aristotle admits:
"The magnanimous person, then, is at the extreme in so far as he makes
great claims. But in so far as he makes them rightly, he is intermediate;
for what he thinks he is worthy of reflects his real worth."42 It would seem
to be more consistent with Aristotle's general virtue picture to restrict the
subject matter of honor in general to the operation of a single virtue,
where the virtuous mean constitutes a reasonable response to all honors,
whether great or small, and leave greatness out of the picture entirely.43
Aristotle is not of much explicit help here, but he has some room for
response. First, negatively, an overly simple construal of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean as an intermediate condition sits uncomfortably with
others of his virtues as well. 44 Aristotle's conception of the straightforward passionate virtue of courage, for example, involves a relationship
between two passions rather than being simply an intermediate condi-
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tion in the expression of one." Justice, like magnanimity, but unlike the
other moral virtues, is tied to external states of affairs rather than to
means of action or passion relative to the agent. 46 Second, magnanimity
is not the only virtue that builds in an external greatness condition: so
also does the other grand virtue, magnificence. Indeed, it is this very
respect that, for Aristotle, primarily distinguishes these extraordinary
virtues from the ordinary. The important question, then, is how actual
greatness could be required for the exemplification of an Aristotelian
moral virtue. Aristotle provides no further insight.
On the one hand, it does seem correct to say that the person of extraordinary virtue-by virtue of being extraordinary, as it were-must possess greater capabilities and opportunities for greater deeds. On the other
hand, if this is granted, the relationship between the grand, extraordinary
virtues and the rest of the moral virtues comes into question. For example, according to Aristotle's doctrine of the unity or connection of the
virtues, one must exemplify all of the virtues in order to exemplify any of
them. But if magnanimity is a moral virtue on a par of order with the others, and if only a supreme few individuals are magnanimous, then it follows that only the supreme few exemplify any of the virtues. To fail to be
magnanimous would be to fail to be virtuous. However, Aristotle clearly
treats magnanimity differently from other virtues in this respect. 47 It is
possible to fail to be magnanimous and yet to be virtuous-for the one
who assesses his lower worth correctly exemplifies the core virtue of temperance, and thus the rest of the moral virtues." How then do we characterize the difference between magnanimity and other virtues?
One important difference between magnanimity and the other virtues
is that magnanimity appears to be a second-order, meta-virtue which is
related to the other, first-order virtues as, in Aristotle's terms, a kind of
adornment which applies when each of the other virtues is greatly exemplified.'" Along this line, the relationship between magnanimity (as extraordinary virtue) and ordinary virtue has been compared to that between
supererogation and obligation." Thus, Sherman suggests, failure to exemplify magnanimity may not be like (blameworthily) failing to exemplify
courage, but instead like exemplifying courage yet failing to do so with
charm or grace (thus being less than great but not being vicious or blameworthy). Magnanimity on this view is a style of virtue that supervenes
upon its complete action- or passion-complement. sl If this is correct,
Aristotle could hold to the unity of the virtues at the ordinary level, while
reserving a further level of extraordinary virtue for an ethical elite.
Is this Aristotle's picture of magnanimity? It seems so, in part.
Aristotle identifies magnanimity as a crowning virtue, which makes the
other virtues greater. Moreover, the distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary virtue seems consistent with Aristotle's assignment of
blame regarding failures of magnanimity. In the case of the temperate
person, who fulfills condition (i) of magnanimity, but not (ii), his low
self-estimation is accurate, commensurate with his low worth. According
to Aristotle he is "not to be blamed," unlike one who fails to exemplify
one of the other moral virtues. Indeed, rather, he is similar to the magnanimous: he has the potential for magnanimity, for should his personal
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worth increase, his accurate self-esteem would increase commensurately
and he would aim at the things of which he is worthy. 52 Since he is virtuous without being magnanimous, magnanimity cannot be necessary to
virtue. Thus magnanimity is not required for a virtuous life. While other
virtues are necessary (but not sufficient) for magnanimity, magnanimity
is an extraordinary virtue, exemplified only by those who are not only
otherwise virtuous, but also possess outstanding gifts and opportunities.
According to Aristotle pusillanimous people, who fulfill condition (ii)
of magnanimity, but not (i), whose low self-esteem is incommensurate
with their great worth, seem hesitant rather than foolish (as are the vain)."
From this it may appear that Aristotle does not wish to blame them,
either. This is not the case: their vice is actually worse than that of vanity;
it is more opposed to magnanimity. Why is this? Because the pusillanimous fail to live up to their potential. It is evident that Aristotle's general
project with respect to magnanimity is to specify the virtue by which particularly gifted and good people may live up to their full potential. Pusillanimity
directly subverts this objective, while vanity fails in a different way,
afflicting those who do not even have the potential for greatness. Both the
temperate and the pusillanimous are potentially magnanimous in the
sense that they each meet one of the criteria. Pusillanimity, however,
involves a moral failure. If one actually possesses outstanding gifts and
opportunities, one is blameable for not exercising them in great ways:
one's lack of self-perception is ethically defective, since magnanimity
involves not just perceiving one's gifts but fully esteeming them, desiring
to exemplify them in action to the fullest extent. The latter is what distinguishes magnanimity as a moral, rather than an intellectual virtue."
However, we need to clarify further. First, while magnanimity is a
second-order virtue it is incorrect to characterize it as supervening upon
the other virtues. The exact relationship between magnanimity and the
other virtues is left unclear by Aristotle, who simply identifies magnanimity as "a sort of" crown or adornment to the virtues. A supervenience relation, however, would entail that, necessarily, if one had greatness in all the virtues one would be magnanimous. 55 What Aristotle
specifies, however, is only that greatness in all the virtues is a necessary
condition for magnanimity; he does not indicate that it is sufficient.
Indeed, that it is not sufficient is indicated by the fact that Aristotle does
not treat magnanimity solely as a second-order virtue, but also treats it as
a particular virtue concerned with a specific subject matter (great things,
honors)." Magnanimity requires more than excellence in all other
virtues; it also requires extraordinary capacities and opportunities for,
and the ability to handle rewards resulting from, extraordinary actions. It
appears to be Aristotle's view that one may excel in other virtues without
possessing extraordinary gifts and opportunities. One may be virtuous or
morally excellent in general; but to be magnanimous one must also excel
in the use of what is extraordinary. This sets magnanimity (with magnificence) apart from Aristotle's other moral virtues, which are firstorder virtues only. Unfortunately Aristotle provides no further account
of how these two types of virtue are related to each other.
A second clarification: while we may think of ordinary virtue as
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"obligatory" (i.e. necessary) for the virtuous, extraordinary virtue, however it may be construed, fits ill with the concept of supererogation. For
while magnanimity is not expected of all good persons, it is nevertheless
not supererogatory for those who possess the requisite gifts and opportunities; for them, it is required.
III

Aristotelian magnanimity faces problems not only of coherence, but
also of content.
1. The magnanimous person appears to have offensive attitudes toward
others. I shall concentrate on the objection that Aristotle's magnanimous
person is disdainful and contemptuous of other people.;7 Indeed,
according to the account in EE, "it seems characteristic of the magnanimous man to be disdainful."58 He is concerned with being honored only
by excellent people, and he despises the inferior. The difference
between the true and the counterfeit magnanimous person is not that
the counterfeit despises others while the magnanimous does not; both
are disdainful, but only the truly magnanimous is justifiably so.
On the other hand, we have seen that the estimation of persons in
view here regards primarily their exemplification of objective worth,
especially virtue. The magnanimous person discriminates on the basis
of virtue-his own and others: esteeming virtue and despising vice. His
attitude is not simply one of superiority; rather his conviction is that
virtue should be honored as superior, wherever it is found. Insofar as
he exemplifies virtue, he is deserving of honor, and similarly for others.
Indeed, the mark of the counterfeit magnanimous person is that he has
contempt for everyone else, thinking himself to be superior to all, and
able to do whatever he pleases. 59 His "superiority" is neither one of
virtue, nor does he recognize virtue in others. He confuses the proper
discrimination of the magnanimous with rank prejudice.
Is the esteeming of virtue and depising of vice objectionable? Surely
not, in principle; without some such estimate no ethical discrimination is
possible. I suggest that what we find objectionable in Aristotle is rather
the apparent absence of any additional, balancing notions of respect for
the worth or dignity of a human being simply qua human being-a basic
level of respect for all, even ethically inferior human beings-and of the
guiding value of positive care and concern for all. Such notions have a
different provenance, however; they arise principally from the biblical
vision of each human being's possessing dignity as created in the image
of God. Those of us who hold to a view of human equality thus face a
question Aristotle didn't, as to how different levels of estimating
worth-qua human being and qua virtuous-may relate. Indeed the
question strikes near the heart of the distinction between an ethics of
virtue and other ethical theories: how may the esteeming (or despising)
of persons with regard to their excellences (which will inescapably be
unequal) be held consistently with a conviction of their equal worth as
human beings?
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2. Finally, the Aristotelian magnanimous person seems to have objec-

tionable attitudes towards himself. He appears to be self-absorbed. 60
His motive for acting appears to be a desire to exemplify his great
worth. But such manifest consciousness of his own great worth and his
desire to exemplify it in action vitiates its very excellence.
To evaluate this objection we should first consider Aristotle's more
general conception of the virtuous person's motivation in choosing an
action, and then, assuming that we consider such a picture to be acceptable, seek to identify the further, putatively objectionable elements of the
magnanimous person's motivation. Aristotle's view seems to be that virtuous motivation enters the practical thought of the virtuous person at
two levels. On the level of first-order practical deliberation ("What shall I
do?"), Aristotle requires that the virtuous person choose the virtuous act
"for itself," or "for its own sake" (di' auta).61 This requirement may seem
priggish or overly self-conscious if it is construed as demanding that the
virtuous (say, generous) person choose the virtuous act qua virtuous act,
i.e. having the thought, "This is a generous act," or "I shall do this because
it is the generous thing to do." However, it need not be so construed.
What is required by Aristotle, rather, may be satisfied by these conditions: that the generous person,S, choose the act, G, for one (or more) of
R reasons (e.g. "He needs the money"), where R reasons express a range
of considerations appropriate to the virtue of generosity. That 5 is generous explains why she is aware of such considerations in the situation
(why they are salient to her), why she takes G to be appropriate, and why
she's motivated to perform it. G, taken in this sense, is the generous
thing to do, and 5 does G "for its own sake" -i.e. for the right reason(s),
R (and not, e.g., under compulsion, in order to manipulate someone, buttress S's reputation, etc.).62 S's generosity explains why 5 recognizes G as
appropriate and performs it; one need not require that 5 be motivated by
consciously having a certain thought, e.g. that G is a generous act.
There is nothing overly self-conscious about such a picture.
However, the problem may seem to resurface in another of Aristotle's
characterizations of the virtuous person's motives, where he insists that
virtuous actions are done for the sake of the fine or noble (to kalon).
"Actions expressing virtue are fine and aim at what is fine."b' Fineness
is a property of virtuous acts which the virtuous person apparently recognizes, and this recognition seems to provide him with a distinctive,
further reason to perform them. Need this recognition provide motivational content to the virtuous person's first-order practical deliberation
("To stand firm here would be a fine action, so I will do it")? In EE
Aristotle distinguishes between the fully virtuous person (kalokagathos),
and the (merely) "good" (agathos) person. The former distinctively values virtuous actions because they are fine. As Broadie and Kenny argue,
however, the distinction concerns, not the content of the agents' practical
deliberation-both choose the virtuous act for its own sake-but the
content of their second-order practical reflection, e.g. when asked about the
point of being virtuous. h4 The fully virtuous person is reflective: he has
thought about what he wants to be, he recognizes in his planning the
supreme value of the virtuous life itself, and he chooses such a life on
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that basis, while the merely good person values virtuous actions because
"it pays" -because of the natural goods such actions make possible.
Aristotle holds generally that desire for what is fine, and revulsion
towards what is shameful, is distinctive of the virtuous person. 65 Thus
reflection about the fineness (or shamefulness) of goods or ends will
provide the reflective, fully virtuous person additional reason to perform (or avoid) them, i.e. to be virtuous generally. Such reflection, of
course, will influence his first-order deliberation as well: it will fine-tune
his perception of such goods or ends as they are exemplified in practical
situations, and thus make additional ethical considerations salient to
him in his practical deliberation. But, again, it need not determine the
content of such deliberation in an offensive way.
Merely good persons, then, in Aristotle's view, may be quite unreflective about their view of virtue and its exemplification. Fully virtuous persons, however, are rightly reflective. Indeed the EN itself is an example of
reflective ethical thinking for virtuous persons concerning the nature and
point of virtue and the good life. Note that such reflection by the virtuous
person will not only involve his considering which goods or ends are virtuous and fine, but also his having a conception of himself to which he
aspires: the desire to exemplify virtue and fineness in action himself. A
certain degree of self-consciousness is unavoidable if one is reflective and
aspires to virtue-prerequisites for full virtue, on Aristotle's view.
Assume that we accept the picture of the virtuous person's practical
thought so far delineated. What is it that further characterizes the motivation of the magnanimous person, which is supposed to render it objectionable? It appears to be his self-conscious awareness of his own great
virtue, and the motivational role of that awareness in his action. Annas
expresses the problem:
Aristotle has not given sufficient thought to the internal perspective involved lin the magnanimous person's practical reasoningl.
For the megalopsuchos has to have this thought, that he merits
greater honor and respect than others do; and this makes exceptional virtue into something self-centred ... But thoughts which
centre on the self in this way are antithetical to the developent of
virtue, not expressive of it. For virtue involves a concern to do the
right thing because it is the right thing, and to be the kind of person who does that-not to do the right thing because one is a person who is outstanding at doing the right thing, and thereby worthy of greater respect than others.66
Note that the problem for Am1as is not the magnanimous person's recognition
that the action is the right/virtuous/fine thing to do, nor even his desire to be
the kind of person who does that (i.e. having a conception of himself to which
he aspires, which exemplifies these desiderata in action). We may suppose
that Annas accepts Aristotle's general picture of the motivation of the virtuous
person in action, as we have analyzed it. What is offensive about the magnanimous man is rather his present self-awareness, his conception of himself-not
of that to which he aspires, but of his own present condition.
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Is there a genernl objection to one's being aware of the condition of
one's character? Surely not. If it is not objectionable for a person to have
a conception of herself to which she aspires, it cannot be objectionable for
her to have a (truthful) conception of herself in via, to be aware of her
own status as she progresses toward the goal, and on that basis to act.
Indeed, progress is unintelligible apart from such a conception. The
problem, rather, seems to be a special one for the magnanimous personthat he (albeit accurately) recognizes his own condition to be great.67
However, if there is no general problem with the consciousness of one's
condition, what are the grounds for insisting upon a special problem for
the magnanimous?
For Annas the problem seems to be that such a perspective will
infect the magnanimous person's practical reasoning in an objectionable
way: if he recognizes his greatness, he will act (B) "because [he] is a person who is outstanding at doing the right thing, and thereby worthy of
greater respect than others." The import of the "because" here, however, is ambiguous. Understood one way, (Bl), "because" introduces the
grounds of the magnanimous man's motivation. This Aristotle certainly
affirms. It is in this sense that the magnanimous person's self-conception is paramount for Aristotle: he wants to live up to his (great) potential, and so must have a sufficient grasp and appreciation of his potential. Annas, however, appears to have another construal in mind, (B2),
where the "because" objectionably determines the specific content of the
magnanimous person's motivation for acting, expressed in his firstorder practical deliberation. We have seen, however, that we need not
require (B2) of Aristotle. (Of course one's recognition of one's assets may
translate into offensively self-conscious practical deliberation. Annas's
objection, however, is that it will do so; for this conclusion a necessary
connection needs to be demonstrated.) Susan's aspiration to live up to
her extraordinary potential as a scientist makes salient for her a range of
considerations as to what is the right thing for her to do in making a particular career choice. However, she is motivated to do what she so identifies because she sees it as the right thing for her to do. Steve aims at
winning the gold medal in the high jump because he is a great highjumper, indeed far better than others. His recognition of his ability
grounds his attempt as reasonable. The desire to be better than everyone else, however, plays no conscious role at all in Steve's practical
deliberation. He simply wants to be the best he can be, to reach the
highest level of which he is able.
It is possible, then, pace Annas, for the magnanimous person, while
fully recognizing his assets, to aspire to great action "because it is the
right thing, and to be the kind of person who does that." What is offensive about Aristotle's picture, I now submit, is not the magnanimous
man's consciousness of his own worth per se-which is rather an expression of the psychological stance that is necessary to his aspiring to great
challenges. What is offensive, instead, is the absence of sufficient balancing factors of moderating humility and positive concern for others. It is
these factors which most significantly distinguish Aquinas's account of
magnanimity from Aristotle's. To this picture we now turn.
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IV

In the Summa Tlzeologiae (ST),"R Thomas Aquinas depends primarily
upon Aristotle for his conception of magnanimity, although he also
draws extensively from biblical, earlier Christian, and Stoic sources."9 I
shall not attempt a complete exposition of Aquinas's extensive account;
we are primarily interested in where Thomas diverges from or expands
upon Aristotle.
From the outset Aquinas situates magnanimity differently from
Aristotle. In the ST, Aquinas discusses some sixty virtues, the rest
falling in some way under the four cardinal or hinge virtues of justice,
temperance, courage, and practical wisdom, or else under the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. The virtue of magnanimity/C] along
with magnificence, patience, and perseverance (this structure drawn
from Cicero)/' falls under the cardinal virtue of courage. 72 Virtue makes
its possessor good. Since a person's good is that he live rationally,
Aquinas infers that virtue aligns a person and his actions with reason.
This occurs in three ways: (i) one's reasoning itself is made right by
intellectual virtues; (ii) rightness in human affairs is established by the
moral virtue of justice; and (iii) the remaining moral virtues remove passional obstacles to the establishment of right human affairs: temperance
removes the obstacle of one's desiring something other than what right
reasoning identifies, while courage removes the obstacle of the will's
being repelled by what, though right, is difficult. Magnanimity falls
under this last category.73
An act of courage will either be an aggressive act (attempting a difficult or dangerous deed) or an act of endurance (the continued pursuit of
a good over time). The virtues of magnanimity and magnificence are
related to the first kind of courageous act, patience and perseverance to
the second. Necessary to an aggressive act is a mental readiness or
aggressiveness, which Cicero calls "confidence" (jiducia). This Aquinas
initially identifies with magnanimity: it disposes one to an aggressive,
hopeful frame of mind in relation to a difficult act.'4 The most difficult
act with which courage is specifically concerned-the defining or limiting case of courage-is facing the danger of death. Magnanimity, qua
confidence or mental aggressiveness, is an essential component of
courage in facing such a circumstance. In the face of lesser dangers, on
the other hand, magnanimity bears a different relation to courage: it is a
distinct virtue, allied with courage as a secondary to a primary virtue,
which is concerned specifically with great honors. c" What is central to
Aquinas's account is that magnanimity shares with courage the essence
of virtues which aim at something difficult: firmness of mind (firmitas
animi).76 From the outset, then, Aquinas characterizes magnanimity
essentially in terms of a mental attitude or psychological stance, aimed
at action: magnanimity is a stretching forth of the mind to great things,
exemplified essentially in great, difficult acts.Ci
There are problems in associating magnanimity with courage. For
one thing, many, perhaps most exemplifications of magnanimity do not
involve facing dangers of death. On the other hand, the relationship
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Thomas describes between magnanimity and courage is illuminating.?S
The essence of magnanimity does seem to be in the neighborhood of an
aggressive, hopeful-frame of mind in relation to a difficult act: a stance
of confidence toward great challenges, rooted in a strong sense of one's
abilities and strengths. Moreover the strength of self which enables one
to accomplish a great action in the face of immediate danger of death,
although perhaps not a typical situation, arguably provides the clearest
paradigm of magnanimity, the central case to which the other significations may be related analogically.

v
Aquinas extends the Aristotelian account helpfully, particularly
where Aristotle's picture is incomplete or confusing. Elements we have
seen to be implicit and embryonic in Aristotle become explicit and
developed in Aquinas. He also draws from other sources to provide
additional insights. I shall address Aquinas's contributions to the issues
I have raised above with Aristotle.

1. A putative internal tension in Aristotle concerns the role of honor and
external goods in magnanimity. Are honors to be sought or despised?
Is the magnanimous person's concern for honor or for virtue? For
Aquinas as for Aristotle, magnanimity is concerned with honors, the
greatest of external goods.'" Aquinas's account is more complex, however. A virtue is related to two things, according to Aquinas: the (subject)
matter of its activity, and its proper act, which consists in the right use of
its matter. Magnanimity's matter is (great) honor, and its end or proper
act, is a great act. so Since a virtue's name is determined primarily by its
act, the magnanimous person is so-called because he is mentally prepared
to do some great act.S! Magnanimity is about handling great honor properly; its aim is great action, which is worthy of great honors.
Why is honor the greatest of external goods? Earlier, in his account
of the virtue of justice, Thomas discussed dulia, or respectful service.
There he argued, expanding upon Aristotle again, that honoring someone is a testimony to his excellence. If this witness is to be borne before
other human beings it must be done with outward signs, such as words,
offering external goods, bowing, etc. Honor is the reward of virtue, not
in the sense that these external things are a sufficient reward, but that
they are rightly employed as signs pointing to eminent virtue, for it is
right that the good and the beautiful be made evident."2
With these distinctions Aquinas addresses the putative Aristotelian
tension. The magnanimous person both pursues honors and despises
them. There are two ways to despise honors (or riches): properly, one
may despise them in the sense of never acting against virtue to attain
them, but only utilizing them in pursuit of virtue. Improperly, however,
one may despise honors by not aiming at doing what deserves honor.
Hence, Thomas clarifies: "And in this way magnanimity is about honor:
not so much that one should value the honors given by human beings,
but that he be eager to do those things that are worthy of honor."'3
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For Aquinas, then, the clear emphasis is internal, rather than external; upon acting virtuously rather than upon the actual honor that
attends it; upon being honorable rather than being honored. 84 When he
says that magnanimity is concerned with great honors, we may gloss it
as: magnanimity is concerned with actions that are worthy of great honors. Thus Aquinas's conception follows our interpretation of Aristotle,
but is more explicit. However, Thomas does preserve an important role
for (received) honor: it is truly worthy of pursuit in so far as it rightly
reflects virtue (i.e. being honorable). Indeed, under such a description
such pursuit is obligatory. He holds to a strong objectivity of value, to
which even the magnanimous person is beholden: true virtue is rightly
honored, and to pursue right honor by being worthy of it is, as it were,
honorable. Aquinas himself provides a more complete gloss on
Aristotle: "that person seems to be magnanimous who thinks himself
worthy of great things, i.e. that he may do great actions and that great
things should happen to him when he is in fact worthy."85
2. Aquinas explicitly addresses questions about the compatibility of
magnanimity with the rest of an Aristotelian virtue picture. According
to Aquinas, a virtue is named by its extreme, limiting case. A virtue perfects a power: this perfection is not obvious in every expression of the
power, but specifically in its great or difficult acts.~6 In the case of moral
virtues related to passions, what is difficult is reason's job of determining an appropriate balance or rational tuning of the passions, since the
passions themselves may resist reason. Such resistance may arise either
from the passions themselves or from the objects of the passions. Since
it is natural for the passions to respond to rational direction, great resistance to reason generally arises from the passions themselves only in the
extreme or limiting cases, which then define their corresponding virtues.
Thus, for example, courage is about the greatest fear and daring, and
temperance about the greatest of desirable pleasures.
For some passions, however, resistance to reason is tied to a specific
kind of exterior object of the passion. Examples include the desire for
money or honor. Maintaining rightness with regard to this kind of passion requires two virtues, each defined with respect to the object: one for
the extreme, particularly strong case, which itself constitutes a discreet
challenge to the agent, and one for the common case-since the external
objects of these passions are necessary for human life they also constitute in their ordinary form a perpetual challenge to reasonableness.
Hence the desire for money requires two virtues to subject it to reason:
magnificence for great sums, generosity for ordinary sums. Likewise
there are two virtues about honors: the unnamed virtue concerns ordinary or small honors, while magnanimity is about great honors, which
have their own particular drawing power. Special challenges require
special excellences. It is true that great and little are accidental to honor,
Thomas admits, when honor is considered in itself. However when
viewed in terms of human action, there is a special, increased difficulty
in acting rationally concerning great honors over against small ones.
Hence a special virtue is required. K7
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However, Aristotelian moral virtues concern passions or actions,
and (received) honor is neither. Indeed, Aquinas considers the objection
that if the matter of magnanimity were honor, an external object, it follows that it would not in fact be a moral virtue. 88 In his earlier discussion
of the aggressive passions he said that the object of such passions is sensible good or evil, not considered absolutely, but under the aspect of
"difficult" or "arduous." In so far as it is seen as good, an arduous or difficult task produces in us a tendency towards it belonging to the passion
of hope, while in so far as the task is seen to be difficult it pertains to the
passion of despair. 89 Thomas now argues that "although honor is neither a passion nor an action, it is nevertheless an object of some passion,
namely hope, which strives toward a difficult good. Indeed magnanimity is immediately about the passion of hope, and mediately about honor,
insofar as it is the object of hope-just as courage is about the dangers of
death insofar as they are the object of fear and daring." That is, magnanimity, with regard to passion, is hope management, just as courage is fear
management. 90 By distinguishing between the passion and its object
Aquinas works out, as Aristotle did not, a relationship between magnanimity and the general Aristotelian virtue picture, and expands his earlier insight that magnanimity is an aggressive, hopeful frame of mind in
relation to a difficult act.
A further Aristotelian tension concerns whether magnanimity is a
specific, first-order virtue or a general, second-order virtue, "crowning"
specific virtues, or both. For Aquinas, it is both. A specific virtue establishes the measure or mode of reason in a determinate matter. In the
case of magnanimity, the matter is honors. Honor, considered in itself,
is a particular kind of good, and so magnanimity considered in itself is a
specific virtue. Magnanimity plays another, general role, however.
Since it is also the reward of every virtue, its matter in this second respect
turns out to include all the virtues-specifically all the great acts of all
the virtues. The magnanimous person intends to do great deeds in
every virtue inasmuch as he aims at those things which are worthy of
great honors.91 Insofar as the acts of the other virtues are great, magnanimity adds its own luster or adornment to the virtues, making them
even greater. 92 Thus for Aquinas, as for Aristotle (contra, e.g., Nietzsche),
it is not possible for one to be both wicked and magnanimous, for the
fulfillment of the other virtues is a necessary condition for magnanimity.
Magnanimity is a moral virtue. 9' It is the disposition to take one's
extraordinary gifts, dispositions, opportunities, or goods of fortune and
aim them at great deeds of virtue: "if one possesses great virtue of soul,
magnanimity makes him strive toward perfect deeds of virtue, and it
should be said similarly concerning the use of any other good, for example knowledge or external fortune."94 Indeed, for Aquinas these great
deeds of virtue are not simply for one's own sake: "his entire attention is
concerned with the goods of the community and God."""
In so far as magnanimity is a specific virtue, then, is it obligatory, necessary to the virtuous life? Aquinas does consider failure in magnanimity to be blameworthy in certain cases, although he has a much fuller and
more complex account of how one may fail to be magnanimous "by
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excess" than Aristotle's simple appeal to "vanity." Aquinas's account is
also more plausible, as certainly not all attempts at objectives beyond
one's abilities and resources are equally problematic or vicious, or done
from the same motivation. For Aquinas, there are three kinds of error
here. "Ambition," for Aquinas, comprises inordinate kinds of desire for
honor, and "vanity" comprises inordinate kinds of desire for "glory."
These errors involve aiming at the wrong objects, or on the wrong
grounds, or while not relating one's desires rightly to the glory of God
or to the benefit of others.'"
Closest to Aristotle's "vanity" is presumption, one's aiming at deeds
out of proportion to one's abilities. 97 What is wrong with this? Should
we not rather encourage people to excel, whatever their abilities? The
problem, for Aquinas, is that such aims fail fundamentally to preserve
the naturally right balance between an action and a power; they are out
of metaphysical, teleological whack. However, Aquinas's intent is clearly not mediocrity or quietism: he advocates the pursuit of excellence by
all, the straining forward of each to advance towards virtue. 98 Nor does
he consider just any attempt which exceeds one's powers to be presumptuous. The kind of acts he has in mind throughout are extraordinary deeds, which require extraordinary resources for success. 99 To enter
Olympic gold medal competition when one is entirely unprepared or
unsuited is blameworthily foolish. Similarly, to accept a high visibility
vocational challenge requiring exceptional ability when one's gifts are
insufficient is not only foolish but shameful, and will likely result in a
waste of time and resources for many.
Pusillanimity is opposed (by deficiency) to the natural inclination to
accomplish an action commensurate with one's capacities. lOll Aquinas
distinguishes the species of pusillanimity-smallness of soul-from its
cause and effect. The cause is both intellectual and appetitive: from the
point of view of the intellect, pusillanimity involves a rational mistake,
an ignorance of one's own condition. With regard to desire, it is a fear of
failing to accomplish an action, which one falsely thinks exceeds one's
capacity. The effect is to shrink from the great things of which one is
worthy.1Ul While magnanimity includes accurate self-knowledge, it is a
self-knowledge with moral content. It involves not only discerning
one's capacities, but desiring to act in a manner fully worthy of them.
Hence, ignorance of the pusillanimous kind does not arise from mere
foolishness, but more from sluggishness, indolence, disinclination, or
even improper pride 102 in the examining of one's capacities or in carrying
out what is under one's power. Magnanimity is desiderative, a moral
virtue: "as it pertains to magnanimity, hope for anything presupposes
one's appetite stretched forth to great things by desire."lOl
Magnanimity, then, is "obligatory" for those so gifted, but not
required of those who are not. Unlike Aristotle, Aquinas does not place
magnanimity on even an apparent par of scope with temperance, justice,
and courage: it is not a cardinal virtue, which has universal application;
it is a subordinate virtue which has only special application, to those
who have particular callings. As does Aristotle, Aquinas appeals as well
to a related ordinary virtue, the unnamed virtue, which does seem to
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have more general application: whatever one's gifts, exemplifying this
virtue would be expected of one, in order for one to be virtuous. In
addition to this general virtue, a special virtue is required of those with
great gifts, in view of the special challenge presented by extraordinary
challenges and honors.
Aquinas, filling out Aristotle's account, manages to preserve both
the minimal requirements of ordinary virtue and the maximal requirements of extraordinary virtue. The maximal is rooted in the minimal; in
going beyond it does not replace, subvert, or compete with it. As with
Aristotle, moreover, to consider magnanimity "supererogatory" is not
apt. For the less gifted, to attempt the great deeds of the magnanimous,
would not be supererogatory-but-not-required: it would actually constitute a failure of virtue: presumption. What is required of each is rather to
aim at fulfilling his rightly-discerned potential. To the less gifted, magnanimity simply does not apply; to the extraordinarily gifted, magnanimity is required. 10' A more apt concept than supererogation to serve
as a supplement to that of the requirements of ordinary virtue, to which
Aquinas could have (but didn't) profitably appeal here, is a theological
one: the notion of one's cailing, which is individualized according to
one's gifts, inclinations, and opportunities. From one to whom much is
given, much is required. JOs

Vi
1. Aristotle characterizes the magnanimous person as exhibiting attitudes to others which seem reprehensible, such as disdain and contempt
for others of lesser worth. Not surprisingly, Aquinas's Christian account
differs significantly from Aristotle's in this respect. How it differs, however, is not so much due to a different notion of magnanimity as it is to
the addition of Christian theoretical background commitments and values which underwrite the need for a theologically grounded humility
and a general respect for human beings as made in the image of God.
These in turn give Aquinian magnanimity a distinctive shape. Where
Aquinas actually specifies the great acts which particularly characterize
the magnanimous person, for example, they look surprisingly like "loving one's neighbor."1l16 "Since the magnanimous person alms at great
things, it follows that he aims especially at those which convey a certain
excellence, and scorns those which tend toward defect. Now it belongs
to such excellence to be beneficent, generous, and grateful."107 Great
acts, for Aquinas, are particularly characterized by care for others. Such
a conception opens up the field of magnanimity, for Thomas, beyond
what is explicit in Aristotle (at least in the Ethics), where great acts take
on a predominately military cast. On Aquinas's conception paradigms
of extraordinary virtue could more obviously include individuals like
Mother Teresa or doctors who choose to work in poor inner cities.
More generally, Aquinas's portrayal of the magnanimous person's
treatment of others is two-tiered. First, as with Aristotle, the magnanimous
person evaluates others in accord with their excellence. He exercises discrimination as to their exemplification of virtue, honoring virtue and despis-
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ing vice. Such powers of discrimination are praiseworthy, for Aquinas;
they are part of prudentia, morally sensitive practical wisdom. On his objectivist view of worth, it is proper to individuals to recognize and value
worth, whether in others or in oneself, and to disdain the lack of such.
At the same time Aquinas, going beyond Aristotle, interprets the
Aristotelian magnanimous man as according even the less worthy person proper respect: "For the magnanimous person is not said to be contemptuous in the sense that he despises others-as it were depriving
them of due respect-but because he does not value them more than he
should."108 Thomas views personal worth on two levels: a floor of general, due respect for all, as well as differential structures of special respect
or valuing of true worth, wherever it is exemplified. Not only are there
honors which are reserved only for the worthy few, but there are also
constraints in the other direction, concerning how one may treat any person, no matter how ignoble or unworthy. '<19
Aquinas makes two additional moves beyond Aristotle, which govern the magnanimous person's esteeming of his own and others' particular excellences. First, he relativizes human worth by placing one's
worth-one's gifts, dispositions, opportunities, and goods-within the
framework of stewardship. According to Thomas, what is great in a
person he has as a gift from God. 110 The view of one's gifts as gifts
excludes improper pride, in the sense of one's holding one's own value
as supreme or entirely self-produced, or as distinguishing oneself in the
most fundamental axiological way from other, differently gifted individuals. It does not exclude a high esteem of one's gifts, however. In fact, it
provides an additional reason for such esteem: gratitude.'"
Second, and on this basis, Thomas introduces another virtue which, in
a different discussion,112 he strikingly describes as a twin virtue (duplex virtus) to magnanimity: humility. These twin virtues keep one within a rational balance with regard to great, difficult honors, and also with regard to
treating people in terms of their worth. Magnanimity disposes one to
think well enough of oneself to live up to one's potential. Humility, a part
of temperance,1I3 helps one recognize one's deficiencies. Magnanimity
also disposes one to despise others insofar as they abandon God's gifts.
To despise them, however, means: to esteem their opinions, values, and
behavior-not their persons-less than one esteems God's gifts, which are
of true worth; and thus not to do anything disgraceful for the sake of
impressing them or out of fear of offending them. Humility, on the other
hand, honors others and esteems them as superior inasmuch as something
of God's gifts are seen in them. Humility opens one's eyes to see and
appreciate the gifts of others, just as magnanimity does for one's own. In
both cases it is the objective value of God's gifts that is emphasized, and
so improper pride is excluded. Magnanimity and humility are not contrary, says Aquinas, although they seem to head in different directions,
since they proceed according to different considerations. 11 • Indeed,
according to Thomas, both are necessary to virtue: together they dispose
one to exercise both the proper esteem and contempt called for in relating
to excellence in oneself and others.115
In relativizing one's worth in terms of gift and stewardship, which
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results in humility, and in affirming the general respect required for others,
Aquinas's Christian presuppositions most significantly alter his broadly
Aristotelian conception of magnanimity. His view is suggestive for all who
both are attracted to an ethics of virtue and subscribe to the equality of
human worth. A notion of basic human dignity may be compatible with an
appreciation of particular excellences and an admiration of superior ones,
when the levels of a minimum of universal respect and a maximum of particular admiration are kept distinct, and when proper esteem and contempt
are aimed rather at ideas and behaviors than at the basic dignity of persons.
Moreover the addition of humility, understood as a complement to magnanimity, provides needed balance to the Aristotelian picture. One who only
grasps one's own strengths, without fully appreciating the strengths of others and acknowledging them when appropriate, is not ethically superior,
however rightly self-confident one may be. Humility is an essential aspect of
handling honors properly.
2. Finally, we face the problem of the magnanimous person's apparent
self-absorption. Aquinas's account shifts Aristotle's emphasis from the
magnanimous man's consciousness of his own great worth to the great
actions for which the magnanimous person strives. Although sufficient
gifts are clearly required by Aquinas for magnanimity, the magnanimous person on Aquinas's conception is not so baldly self-conscious as
he appears in Aristotle. Indeed Aquinas's most explicit account of the
magnanimous person's recognition of the greatness of his own strengths
actually appears in the context of Aquinas's discussion of humility,
where he describes them as gifts of God.116
I argued above that the magnanimous person's awareness of his
strengths need not be offensive, per se, although in Aristotle's explicit
picture this awareness is insufficiently balanced by moderating humility
and positive concern for the welfare of others. Aquinas's account provides these balancing considerations. With these considerations in
mind, we may accept the central insight of Aristotle's and Aquinas's
accounts of magnanimity, which is that a proper recognizing and
esteeming of one's gifts seems not only unobjectionable but necessary for
one's reasonably attempting difficult challenges. Magnanimity-indeed
its name as "great-souled"-constitutes at its core the notion of one's
having sufficient psychic strength to aim at a great but difficult action.
Unless one has the confidence that one can do it, that one has the gifts
and abilities to meet the task, one will not reasonably attempt it. Such
confidence requires an awareness of one's gifts and abilities, a conception of oneself as being capable of the task, and a desire to express that
conception in action.
Is a clear awareness and appreciation of one's gifts and abilities
compatible with Christian virtue? We may reasonably complain that
Aquinas does not go far enough in relativizing one's view of one's
worth: he does not emphasize in this context, as does the New
Testament generally, the grace of God in forgiving and blessing decidedly unvirtuous human beings. Still, having an accurate appraisal of one's
gifts as gifts is commended by no less than st. Paul: "For by the grace
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given me I say to everyone of you: Do not think of yourselves more
highly than you ought, but rather think of yourselves with sober judgment,117 in accordance with the measure of faith God has given you ...
We have different gifts, according to the grace given us ... [each should
use his gift1 in proportion to his faith" (Romans 12.3, 6).lIk
Aquinas is, if anything, less reluctant than Aristotle to attribute to
the magnanimous person the desire to exemplify great excellence in his
actions. "Thus the magnanimous person intends to do great deeds in
every virtue; that is, in so far as he aims at those things which are worthy of great honors." 119 Moreover, he avoids defective, vicious acts (such
as untruthfulness or complaining) under a special conception (speciaiem
rationem), as being contrary to excellence or greatness. '20 The virtue of
magnanimity, then, gives its possessor a further reason to act (avoid acting) in a given situation, beyond his recognition that such an act is virtuous (vicious): viz. that it is (not) great. Indeed, an act, say of courage, so
performed, now belongs to a further species of act-magnanimity-following, Aquinas notes, a different motive. 121
This can largely be understood along the lines we traced with Aristotle.
The magnanimous person's awareness of his own strengths and his con~ 'eration and valuing of acts that are great may play their primary role in 'i
second-order reflection concerning the kind of life that is worth living,
rather than in his first-order deliberations about what to do. His grasp of
what is great, and his motivation to perform it, are explained by his being
magnanimous, but his choice of the great act may be simply "for its own
sake"; he need not have the thought that it is an extraordinarily great act.
Still it is natural to read both Aristotle and Aquinas as assuming that
a magnanimous person would in at least some cases have such a thought,
i.e. would construe the practical situation facing him in a way that
expresses a more conscious awareness of his abilities and the greatness
of the act he is considering. Even this, however, is not necessarily problematic. An extraordinarily gifted individual so situated may well recognize the appropriateness of certain actions in so far as they express or
exemplify the greatness to which she consciously aspires; she may see
an action as: the kind of act I am able to do, the kind I aspire to do
because of who I am and the gifts I possess, and the kind of act I should
be ashamed not to do (and in this sense "must" do)-although it is not
required of me by others, nor would I blame anyone else for not doing
it. A person so gifted and situated would thus see contrary acts as
"beneath" her, as not exemplifying in action what she takes herself to be
and aspires to be-although they are not vicious acts, or ones that she
would blame someone else for doing. 122 There need be nothing offensive
about this picture.
VII

By way of summarizing the picture of magnanimity that has developed here, consider a contemporary paradigm of a remarkable, extraordinary individual: an educational administrator who takes on the challenge of becoming the principal of a depressed, dangerous inner city

ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS ON MAGNANTMITY

437

school, with the aspiration of making it one of the nation's outstanding
schools. Individuals have accomplished similar aims with remarkable
success in recent years. What does such a person require? She needs
exceptional gifts of leadership, political and economic savvy, relational
skills, and experience. Moreover, she needs to know that she has those
strengths, and that she can use them effectively. Further, however, she
needs an aggressive, hopeful frame of mind in relation to a difficult act, a confident stance towards her challenge, which will impel her towards it.
These are the components of magnanimity: for the exceptionally gifted,
a clear understanding of her strengths and a sufficiently confident
appreciation of them which will enable her to act in aggressive hope of
success. The virtue of humility enables her to see her weaknesses as
well, so as to temper her confidence with realism and to see and value
the strengths of others, enabling her to work with them more effectively.
Why does such a magnanimous person take on the challenge?
Because it "needs" to be done? Certainly it does, but many things need to
be done. Why this one? Because one of her beliefs is that there ought to
be more good schools? Again, there are manifold ways to contribute to
good schools. Here, it seems to me, when we seek to explain the magnanimous person's actions, appealing in some way to her self-consciousness
is plausible, if not unavoidable. She takes on the challenge because it's an
eminently worthy task, a fine action which she is uniquely qualified to do, and
which expresses the kind of excellence which she knows she is capable of and
aspires to exemplify to the highest degree. It's a gold medal-type challenge,
whether she is in fact so honored or not. Beyond the other virtues it
expresses, it is a great act, and this provides an additional reason for her to
do it, since she sees herself as capable of and aspiring to such greatness.
Her strengths and the act's greatness uniquely converge, such that were
she not to do the act, she would be ashamed of herself; she would have
failed to aspire to her potential. She would have missed her "calling."
I suggest that this picture plausibly represents how extraordinary
excellence is in fact expressed in terms of practical reasoning. Is it offensive from a Christian perspective? It need not be, particularly if Thomas's
additional insights are appropriated. Such a person, following Aquinas,
need not be arrogant; she may esteem her gifts highly as gifts from God,
and her humility may dispose her fully to value others' gifts as well. She
need not be priggish or self-absorbed; indeed her strong sense of self may
liberate her, as Thomas suggests, to give her whole attention to the good
of others,123 rather than constantly seeking their affirmation.124
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NOTES
1. John Casey, Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990),200.
2. I shall use "magnanimity" to render the Greek megalopsuchia and
Latin magnanimitas. Besides "magnanimity" and "great-souledness" (its lit-
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eral rendering), megalopsuchia is also rendered by Aristotle's interpreters as
pride (Ross), high-mindedness (Ostwald), superiority (Thomson), and dignity (Joachim).
3. I do not assume that the differences in cultural and religious context
between Aristotle and Aquinas, and between both of them and us, are
insignificant. Nor do I wish to suggest that the concept of magnanimity
remains unaltered between these contexts. What I do assume is that there is
sufficient common ground in human experience with respect to basic
human needs and capacities-in Nussbaum's term, "grounding experiences" -to fix the general virtue-type for which Aristotle and Aquinas each
provide specification, and that we (particularly as philosophical descendents of both thinkers) are able to come to some understanding and evaluation of those specifications on their own terms and in light of our background convictions. See Martha C. Nussbaum, "Non-Relative Virtues: An
Aristotelian Approach," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XIII: Ethical
Theory: Character and Virtue, ed. P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, and H. K.
Wettstein (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 32-53; and
Nussbaum, "Comparing Virtues," Journal of Religious Ethics 21 (1993): 345396. For a caution regarding Nussbaum's approach, see Robert C. Roberts,
"Emotions Among the Virtues of the Christian Life," Journal of Religious
Ethics 20 (1992), 63. For an excellent (and relevant here) discussion and
account of cross-cultural ethical analysis, see Lee H. Yearley, Mcncius and
Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1990).
4. I shall be concerned primarily with Aristotle's account in EN, and to
a lesser extent with the Ethica Eudemia (EE). Translations of EN (with additions or alterations in parentheses) are from Nicomachcan Ethics, trans. T. H.
Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985); translations of other works of Aristotle
are from J. Barnes, ed., Complete Works of Aristot/f': the Revised Oxford
Translation, 2 vols. (Princeton: 1984).
I shall not address every aspect of magnanimity. For example I shall
not be concerned with Aristotle's description of the magnanimous person's
mannerisms and voice (1] 25a 13-16) (although Aquinas does try to incorporate and defend these (ST llalIae.129.3.3». For some interesting cultural
insights into these matters, see Dirk t. D. Held, "Megalopsuchia in
Nicomachean Ethics iv," Ancient Philosophy 13 (1993): 95-110.
5. Since Aristotle not only uses exclusively male pronouns here, but
also obviously means to restrict the scope of magnanimity to men (complete
with "deep voice," 1125a13-16), I shall not attempt to use inclusive language
in explicating him. The same holds for Aquinas, although I suggest that his
broadening of Aristotelian magnanimity in several respects would in principle open him to the inclusion of women.
6. 1123a34-bl.
7. 1123bl-4.
8. Aristotle suggests, but does not explain further, that failure to be
magnanimous-by excess, as it were-is actually more complex than this:
"not everyone who thinks he is worthy of greater things than he is worthy
of is vain" (1123b9). As we shall see, Aquinas's account here, as if following
this hint, is significantly more complex.
9. 1123b8-12; 1125a27-35; 1123b5-6; 1123b7-10.
10. 1123bl1-12.
11. Howard J. Curzer, "A Great Philosopher's Not So Great Account of
Great Virtue: Aristotle's Treatment of 'Greatness of Soul'," Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 20 (1990), 527, so limits (i), and considers it an intellectual virtue.
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12. 1124a18-20.
13. 1123b15-24.
14. 1124a5-9.
15. 1123b36; 1124a25.
16. 1124al-3.
17. 1124a27-1124bl.
18. 1124b19-1125a9.
19. 1124b5-7.
20. 1124b10-15.
21. W. D. Ross, Aristotle: A Complete Exposition of His Works and Thought,
Fifth ed. (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), 203.
22. Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral
Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the TW('Jltieth Century (New York: Collier
Books, 1966),79.
23. For attempts to answer other objections as well, see Howard J.
Curzer, "Aristotle's Much Maligned Megalopsychos," Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 69 (1991): 131-151.
24. Harry V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotclianism: A Study of the Commentary
by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1952),123-127.
25. Curzer, "Not So Great," 518-522, opts for virtue as the core of
Aristotle's account, and downplays the rOle of honor. However Aristotle is
as explicit, or more, about the centrality of honor than he is about virtue,
and this needs to be accounted for.
26. See D. A. Rees, "'Magnanimity' in the Eudemian and Nichomachean
Ethics," in Untersuchungen zur ElIdel11ischen Ethik, ed. Paul Moraux and
Dieter Harlfinger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970),231-243; Neil Cooper,
"Aristotle's Crowning Virtue," Apeiron 22 (1989): 191-205; Curzer, "Not So
Great"; and Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993) for variations on this thesis.
27. 1232b14-22.
28. Cooper, "Aristotle's Crowning Virtue," 196-197. This is implicit in
the picture in EN as well, where the magnanimous person discriminates
between the honors given by excellent or "just anyone," and for something
worthy vs. something small (1124a10).
29. For discussions of the concept of honor, see Peter Berger, "On the
Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor," in Revisions: CJzanging Perspectives in
Moral Philosophy, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 172-181; Held,
"Megalopsuchia."
30. EN 1124a20-27.
31. 1124a26-1124b1.
32. 1123b35-1124a12.
33. A problem for my view is that Aristotle, normally sensitive to
homonymy, does not explicitly appeal to the distinction I have made here.
It is an Aristotelian insight, however, that homonyms are often missed (e.g.
Physics 7.4). On homonymy in Aristotle, see T. H. Irwin, "Homonymy in
Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics 34 (1981): 523-544. In further defense of my
reading: it renders Aristotle's remarks here consistent with his accounts of
honor, self-sufficiency, and external goods in book 1 of EN (d. Roger Crisp,
"Aristotle's Inclusivism," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy XII (1994): 111136), and with his assertion in the All. Post. that Socrates, whose life ended
without (received) honor, was magnanimous (97b15-25). The account in EE
seems to emphasize honors received: "He would be pained if denied honor,
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and if ruled by one undeserving. He delights most of all when he obtains
honor" (1232bll-12). This is followed immediately, however, by the distinctions discussed above, concerning who gives the honors and on what basis.
These distinctions assume the objectivity of value noted, and hence the distinction between receiving and being worthy of honor. However, I do not
wish to claim that Aristotle downplayed or was not concerned with received
honors.
34. Aquinas follows Aristotle here, disagreeing in some respects with
Seneca and Cicero (ST IIaIIae.129.8). I cannot pursue here the relation
between external goods and magnanimity, except to note that Aristotle
appears to emphasize much more than Aquinas the role of external goods in
the "great worth" of the magnanimous person, a view which suggests that a
poor person could not be magnanimous. Aquinas's conception of personal
goods and of the great actions at which the magnamimous man aims (some
of which is in Aristotle, but more implicitly), broadens the scope of magnanimity.
35. 1124a30-1124b7.
36. EN2.3.
37. Magnanimity is not the only Aristotelian virtue tied to objects external to the agent. So also is the other grand virtue, magnificence. Justice is
also necessarily linked to specific, objectively discernible external states of
affairs.
38. 1125a20-27, my emphasis.
39. 1125a28-32.
40. According to Rees, "'Magnanimity'," 240, the great things in EE are
above all great actions.
41. Cf. 1124b7-9, 1117b7-9.
42. 1123b13-14.

43. According to Curzer, "Not So Great," 532ff., the mean doctrine and
greatness are simply incompatible; the attempt to combine them is a
holdover of Aristotle's failed effort to synthesise Homeric and Socratic conceptions of magnanimity.
44. See J. O. Urmson, "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean," in Essays 011
Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: 1980), 157-170. Eckart
Schiitrumpf, "Magnanimity, Megalopsuchia, and the System of Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics," Archive fur Geschichte der Philosophie 71 (1989), 13, points
out that an important positive aspect of Aristotle's discussion of magnanimity is that here" Aristotle guards himself against a potential misunderstanding, namely that the concept of the mean in his definition of virtue should be
understood as mediocrity."
45. 1117a30.
46. EN 2.6; 5.3ff.
47. Curzer, "Not So Great," 530, recognizes the difference here, but takes
it to signify a difference between natural and moral virtues rather than
between ordinary and extraordinary moral virtues.
48. 1123b5.
49. 1123b30-1124a3.
50. Nancy Sherman, "Common Sense and Uncommon Virtue," in
Midwest Studies ill Philosophy: Volume XI1l: Ethical Character and Virtue, ed. P.
A. French, T. E. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1988),97-114; Annas, Morality of Happiness. Neither
attributes to Aristotle himself a conception of supererogation.
51. Sherman, "Common Sense," 104.
52. EE 1233a 15-24; EN 1125a22.
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53. EN 1125a24.
54. Curzer ("Not So Great," 532) construes (i) in terms of intellectual
rather than moral virtue, and denies the centrality of desire in Aristotle's
account: "Rather it seems that the appropriately ambitious person
[unnamed virtue] desires honor rightly, whatever he deserves, while the
megalopsychos deserves and thinks he deserves great honor, whatever he
desires. Thus, although magnificence is a large scale version of liberality,
megalopsychia is not a large scale version of ambition [the unnamed virtue] at
all." This is inconsistent with Aristotle's picture. First, it separates what
Aristotle puts together generally and specifically. A general desire for excellence is assumed in the account as a whole, entailed by Aristotle's metaphysical teleology whereby each thing necessarily seeks its own perfection.
Moreover Aristotle applies this desire specifically here: "For each sort of
person seeks what [he thinks] he is worth" (1125a25). Second, it denies
Aristotle's explicit claim, also reflected in the chiastic structure of EN 4.1-4.4,
that magnanimity is related to the unnamed virtue as magnificence is to
generosity.
55. An objection to magnanimity by Curzer, "Not So Great," 530-531,
rests on a confusion here.
56. According to Sherman, "Common Sense," 104, magnanimity has
general and special senses in the EE, but only a "supervenient" one in the
EN. This claim cannot be sustained by the EN account.
57. A related objection is that the magnanimous man is ungrateful, not
remembering the good done to him. His apparently reprehensible attitudes
in this regard, however, also appear to be incompatible with others of
Aristotle's own explicit views, spelled out elsewhere. In discussing exceptional virtue (i.e. that which goes beyond what is required by law) in the
Rhetoric, Aristotle lists "gratitude to, or requital of, our benefactors, readiness to help our friends, and the like" (1374a25), and argues that equity
"bids us remember benefits rather than injuries, and benefits received rather
than benefits conferred" (1374b16-17). Thus Aquinas's brief supplementary
considerations in ST IIaIIae.129.3 ad 5, which construe Aristotelian magnanimity as compatible with the virtue of gratitude (Aquinas's account of the
virtue of gratitude is in IIaIIae.106-107), has the additional value of rendering Aristotle's own account consistent. This provides further support to the
general line of interpretation of Aristotle being followed here.
58. 1232a40.
59. EN 1124bl-2.
60. On Aristotle's picture, Jaffa asserts, the magnanimous man's greatest
preoccupation in between his moments of greatness must be the contemplation of his own greatness. Thomism and Aristotelianism, 140.
61. EN l105a32.
62. See Bernard Williams, "Acting as the Virtuous Person Acts," in
Aristotle and Moral Realism, ed. Robert Heinaman (London: UCL Press, 1995),
13-23; and Rosalind Hursthouse, "The Virtuous Agent's Reasons: A Reply
to Bernard Williams," in ibid., 24-33.
63. 1120a23. E.g. in relation to courage (3.7, 1115b20-23; 1116a13;
3.8,1116b31); temperance (3.12, 1119b17); generosity (4.1, 1120a25).
64. 1248b-1249a7. See Sarah W. Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1991) , 373-383; and Anthony Kenny, Aristotle on
the Perfect Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) , 9-15.
65. EN 2.3, 1104b31-34; 8.2, 1155b16-18; 8.13, 1162b35-1163al.
66. Annas, Morality of Happiness, 118.
67. It wiII not do to seek to evade this problem by denying that
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Aristotle's magnanimous person is aware of his own condition (pace
Broadie, Ethics with Aristotle, 121n.29). His consciousness of his own worth
is a necessary condition, i.e. (i), of his being magnanimous; it is for Aristotle
a desideratum, not a problem. Moreover, for Aristotle, the necessity for
virtue of recognizing the extent of one's worth is not limited to magnanimity. In books 8 and 9 of EN Aristotle's conception of complete friendship,
based on shared virtue, presupposes one's awareness of the worth of oneself
and others. For Aristotle, such a friendship provides the context for what
we have seen as one's valuing the honor extended by excellent people (i.e.
good friends). See Cooper, "Aristotle's Crowning Virtue," 201-203.
68. Translations of Aquinas are my own, from the ST and from
Aquinas's commentary on EN (Sententia Libri Ethicorum, hereafter In EN).
69. His explicit appeals to authority in the sed contra portions of his discussion on magnanimity include four appeals to Aristotle, two to Cicero,
one to Macrobius and Andronicus, and one to the Bible. Besides the sed contra appeals, he also cites Pseudo-Dionysius, Seneca, and Isidore.
70. IIaIIae.129.
71. De Inv. Rhet. ii.
72. IIaIIae.123-140. There are also hints of a close relationship between
magnanimity and courage in Aristotle. The courageous person faces death
in the finest conditions, which is endorsed by honors (111Sa29-36); the magnanimous man faces dangers in a great cause only, since he honors few
things (1124b7-9). See Casey, Pagan Virtue, 62ff. For an extensive account of
courage in Aquinas, see Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas. Concerning how the
conception of courage is changed by Aquinas's Christian outlook, see
Stanley Hauerwas, "The Difference of Virtue and the Difference it Makes,"
Modern Theology 9 (1993): 249-264.
73. IIaIIae.123.1.
74. He later more finely distinguishes the two: confidence belongs to
magnanimity as a certain mode of hope (IIaIIae.l29.6 ad 3).
75. IIaIIae.128.
76. TIaIIae.129.S.
77. IIaIIae.129.1,2.
78. For more on problems and illuminations see Yearley, Mencius and
Aquinas, 33-36.
79. An interesting biographical sidelight is that Aquinas consistently
refused ecclesiastical honors. James A. Weisheipl, O. P., Friar Thomas
D' Aqu ino: His Life, Thought, and Works (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974),48.
80. IlaIIae.129.8
81. IIaIIae.129.1.
82. IIaIIae.103.1; 103.1 ad 3. Cf. EN 1124aS-9. Here Aquinas appeals to
Matthew 5.15, that a light shouldn't be hid under a bushel.
83. IIaIIae.l29.1 ad 3.
84. See IIaIIae.13l.1 ad 3.
85. In EN 4.8.736.
86. This is how Aquinas interprets Aristotle's statement that "both craft
and virtue are concerned in every case with what is harder" (EN 2.3, 110Sa910).

87. IIaIIae.129.2.; 129.2 ad 1.
88. IIaIIae.129.1 obj. 2.
89. IaIIae.23.2.
90. IIaIIae.129.7. Hope here is to be distinguished from the theological
virtue of hope. The theological virtue of hope concerns something arduous
to be obtained by another's help, while magnanimity, whose proper object is
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the doing of great acts, tends to something arduous in the hope of obtaining
something within one's own power (TTaIIae.17.5 ad 4).
91. IIaIIae.129.4; ad 1.
92. IIaIIae.129.4 ad 3.
93. IIaIIae.129.3 ad 1.
94. IIaIIae.129.3 ad 4; d. 133.1 ad 2.
95. In EN 4.10.779.
96. IIaIIae.131,132.
97. IJaJIae.130.
98. IIaIIae.130.1 ad 1.
99. IIaIIae.130.2 ad 2.
100. IIaIIae.133.1.
101. IIaIIae.133.2.
102. IIaITae.133.2 ad 1. The refusal to employ one's great goods for the
sake of virtue can be the product of pride (superbia), when one depends too
much on one's own (low) opinion of oneself, and is unwilling to accept the
more accurate, higher estimation of oneself by others (133.1 ad 3). It should
be obvious from this, as well as from the rest of the discussion, that the
"proper pride" of magnanimity was not considered by Aquinas to be equivalent, intensionally or extensionally, to arrogance, vanity, or the pride
(superbia) condemned by Christianity.
103. IIaIIae.12S.6.
104. Although Aquinas does see the seeds of magnanimity present even
in those virtuous persons who do not now possess the great gifts and opportunities required for magnanimity (IIaIIae.129.3 ad 2).
105. Luke 12.48. Aquinas does not cite this Scripture, but he does relate
pusillanimity to the biblical story of the unwise steward who buried his talents (IIaIIae.133.l).
106. Again, this is not entirely alien to Aristotle's view. See Rhet. 1366b17:
"Magnanimity is the excellence that disposes us to do good to others on a
large scale." In the Ethics, the actions of the magnificent person are for the
benefit of the polis (1123a5). It is implicit that this would hold of the magnanimous (the other grand virtue) person as well.
107. ITaIIae.129.4 ad 2.
10S.In EN 4.10.774.
109. For an account of Aquinas's developed theory of equal regard for
persons, see Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas fiJI'
Christian Ethics (London: SPCK, 1990), ch. 5.
110. IIaIIae.129.3 ad 4.
111. That is, one additionally rightly esteems, rather than despises, gifts
that are graciously given one by God. It is also true that due esteem of one's
gifts will rightly result in gratitude towards the giver, so that esteem provides reason for gratitude, just as gratitude provides reason for esteem.
112.IIaIIae.161.1.
113. Note that Aquinas is building upon an Aristotelian foundation here
in relating temperance to the question of esteeming one's own worth. What
is new is that Aquinas makes a part of temperance-humility-not only necessary to the one of few gifts, but also to the one of many.
114.IIaIIae.129.3 ad 4.
115. Cf. Josef Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1966) , 189-192.
116. IIaIIae.129.3 ad 4.
117 .... phronein cis to s6phronein ...
l18.The context of using one's gift here, however, is shaped by distinc-
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tively Christian values: "Be devoted to one another in brotherly love. Honor
one another above yourselves" (Romans 12.10). (New international Version)
119.IIaIIae.129.4ad 1.
120. IIaIIae.129.4 ad 2.
121. In EN 4.8.746.
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